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A NEW VIEW OF CAUSATION:

BEING AN INQUIRY INTO

THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF

CAUSATION;

AND AN ANALYSIS OF OUR IDEA OF

NECESSARY CONNECTION.

WITH A CLASSIFICATION OF THE OPINIONS OF MODERN METAPHYSICIANS.

PROVOST & Co., 36, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

EXAMINATION

OF

GILLESPIE.

T. S. BARRETT.

EXAMINATION OF GILLESPIE:

BEING

AN ANALYTICAL CRITICISM OF

THE ARGUMENT *A PRIORI*

FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A GREAT FIRST CAUSE,

AS DEVELOPED BY MR. W. H. GILLESPIE IN HIS

"NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF GOD."

BY

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"The reasonings which would *demonstrate* his [God's] being, are called *a priori*. Those which give *probable evidence*, only, for his being, *a posteriori*."

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

PROVOST & CO., 36, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

1871.

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"If *necessity* do concern things in themselves, *necessity* is yet no predicate of a thing, any further than it expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding the existence of the thing. In fine, necessity lies not so much in the *objective* reality, as in the *subjective* mind."—

W. H. GILLESPIE.

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"A weak, imperfect proof of the existence of GOD, when it does not leave the attentive mind in the exact condition in which it was found, will incline it—if any direct effect whatever be produced—to take the first step in the road to atheism. And the reader need not be told, that a bad argument, for a Great First Cause, must confirm and encourage the atheist in his disbelief."

W. H. GILLESPIE.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

The First Edition was published semi-anonymously, having initials instead of name on the title-page. Hence the customary "we,"—which I have allowed to remain—though, having now dropped the *incog.*, I ought properly to make the alteration to the singular number. Indeed, the present issue may be regarded as a verbatim reprint of the original, —almost the only difference between the two editions being the making of a few corrections which before stood in a table of "errata."

Controversial tractates like the present necessarily have but a limited circulation. Out of ten persons who see Mr. Gillespie's treatise it is certain that not more than one will read this reply. Such being the case, I might well (it will be thought) have followed Hume's example in not replying to his critics, and have abstained from further discussion. I am fully sensible of the force of this argument, and shall therefore reply merely to two counter-criticisms, one of which raises so important a question (though, as it will be seen, based on a misunderstanding of my words) that a brief consideration thereof may not be altogether out of place.

The first objection to which I refer is to be found in an article entitled "The A Priori Argument and some of its recent Critics," which appeared in *The Christian Ambassador*

for February, 1871. The objection is to my assertions (see below, p. 13) that Mr. Gillespie's "axiom," *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*, is very far from being necessarily true, and that volumes of controversy have been written on it. The reviewer rejoins :—

"A thing may [in T. S. B.'s opinion] begin to be without cause. It is a pity but what an example or two had been given. But, says our critic, volumes of controversy have been written to show on the one side that a thing may have, and on the other side that it cannot have, an uncaused beginning. It has not been our privilege to meet with any of these volumes. The nature of causation . . . . has been a subject of considerable discussion. . . . But the fact itself has never been questioned. . . . . Indeed, the nature of it could not have been made a subject of discussion had the reality of it been disputed."

Now, in the first place, the attributing to me of the opinion that a thing may begin to be without cause, though in one sense literally correct, does, owing to the poverty and ambiguity of logical language, actually convey an entirely false impression to the reader. Indeed, with the remark immediately following, that it was a pity I did not give an example of something beginning without cause, the "may" might just as well have been written "does actually sometimes." Whereas the word "may" only conveys my meaning when strictly confined to the signification of "may, for aught we can prove in contradiction," as "There *may* be, somewhere, beings with four heads and three tails." It is proverbially difficult to prove a negative; and when we cannot disprove an existence or a possibility, the statement that it "*may* be" is merely a way of expressing such an inability on our part. Thus, if (as I meant) we cannot prove that *whatever begins to be* always and everywhere, has had, has, and will have a cause, it follows that Mr. Gillespie's

"axiom" is not "necessarily true," and that *for anything which we can show*, there may have been, or may be, somewhere, something beginning without a cause. I need scarcely prove that such a proposition is very different from the statement that something *has* begun, *does* begin, or *will* begin without a cause.

With regard to the other point in the reviewer's criticism, —his denial (or next to denial) that the necessary truth of Mr. Gillespie's "axiom" has ever been a topic of discussion, —as I intend elsewhere to consider at large the whole question of causation, I shall in this place simply mention Mr. G. H. Lewes as *one* who has contributed to the controversy. In a masterly chapter* of his "Biographical History of Philosophy," that acute writer shows that the belief in Universal Causation is a generalisation from experience, and therefore not apodeictic.

"We have argued with a student of chemistry whom we found it impossible to convince that the law 'Every event has some cause' is universal. He not only could conceive it to be otherwise in the moon; but he looked upon our argument as an unwarrantable assumption."†

The other criticism referred to above is in a degree just. Mr. Gillespie has said that to understand the following pages, they must be "read alongside of" the work criticised. This is true so far as regards the remarks on his Second Proposition;‡ but with respect to the others I have endeavoured (and I hope successfully) to present Mr. Gillespie's arguments wherever I have had to comment on them. The

* Kant's Fundamental Principles.

† *Knight's Pocket Edition*, 1846, vol. iv. p. 131; *Library Edition*, 1857, p. 558.

‡ See below, p. 15.

defect with regard to the Second Proposition I now remedy by giving the demonstration.

"Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Extension can be separated: that is, *a part* of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain distance, *from* Infinity of Extension; *there remaining Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken away:* the part of infinity of Extension so removed, being removed *from* the remaining parts *to* these very same parts; *the part, thus, being at rest while it is taken away:* the part so moved away, being moved away *from itself; it still remaining,* inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension; that is, though moved away, being not moved away. As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not indivisible."

Mr. Gillespie has just brought out a fifth edition of his Argument, with several fresh Propositions concerning the Attributes; but as they all depend for their validity on the Propositions examined in the following pages, I have thought it quite unnecessary to say anything about them. There are a few alterations in some of the "demonstrations" which I have criticised, but they are neither many nor fundamental. Accordingly, I have neither revised nor compared my quotations with the new edition, but have let them remain *in statu quo.*

T. S. B.

Langley House,
Grove Lane, Camberwell,
March 14th, 1871.

PREFACE.

For the information of those readers who may not have met with the Work criticised in the following pages, it may be as well to state that Mr. Gillespie's 'Argument *à priori* for the Existence of a Great First Cause,' is to be found beginning at page 83, of a book entitled 'The Necessary Existence of God,' by William Honyman Gillespie, Esq., of Torbanehill, — said book being procurable, for a small sum, at the shop of Messrs. Houlston & Wright, Publishers, 65, Paternoster Row.

This book contains several things besides the production that is especially to be under consideration. From page 3 to 12 is An Inquiry into the Defects of mere *A Posteriori* Arguments;—from 13 to 73, Reviews of the *à priori* arguments of Locke, Clarke, Lowman, and others;—from 74 to 82, arguments to prove that 'Necessary Existence implies Infinite Extension';—and from 119 to the end of the volume is "An Examination of Antitheos's 'Refutation.'" 'Antitheos' was the *nom de plume* of one who wrote a critique (to wit, the said 'Refutation') on Mr. Gillespie's Argument a great many years ago. He flourished before we

knew what Existence meant. In fact he was a sort of predecessor of ours.

"Time passes—a way Time has."

We wish poor Artemus Ward had lived to debate with Mr. Gillespie. He would have thrown some fresh light on the subject of DURATION, which would have puzzled his opponent greatly.

London, July 19th, 1869.

EXAMINATION

OF

MR. GILLESPIE'S ARGUMENT

FOR A

GREAT FIRST CAUSE.

THE belief in the existence of a Deity is neither innate nor intuitive. It is highly probable that ever since the earth has been peopled with human beings, there have always been some individuals without any belief in the existence of a God; and it may be stated as a pretty well ascertained fact, that at the present day, people die every year who have had at no time during their lives any belief in a Deity. Of course, all such are either savages or lamentably ignorant persons—uncivilized people like those encountered by Sir Samuel Baker during his travels in Africa, or City Arabs like those to be met with in the worst parts of St. Giles's. But, nevertheless, it still shows that the belief in a God is not innate.*

* See Appendix A, p. 39.

The question of course naturally arises—Then, how is the belief obtained? To this the answer is—At the present day, chiefly by education. We are taught the existence of a God during tender childhood,—at the time we are most susceptible of imbibing ideas and beliefs;—and when we arrive at maturer age, we either retain the belief from habit—never having met with anything to make us doubt the correctness of our early education; or else we retain the belief, confirmed and consolidated by our own thoughts or by the arguments of others.

Now, these arguments and these thoughts are more or less of that kind which 'ascend from nature up to nature's God;' in other words, they would trace what are deemed effects to their cause—their Great First Cause. Such arguments for the existence of a God are called Arguments *à posteriori*.

By most minds it would naturally be thought that if the existence of a Deity is to be proved by reason alone, it must always be by means of some such kind of argument as those called *à posteriori*. This, we say, would be the natural conclusion of most minds. But there is a race of Philosophers who despise common sense and all common ways of doing things; and these Elevated Beings have great faith in a process of arriving at truth which they call *metaphysics*. Now science and common sense both teach that the proper way of proceeding is to commence with ascertained facts or effects, and ascend from them to their causes—in other words, science and common sense equally announce that the proper path of discovery is the *à posteriori*. But Metaphysics comes

on the stage and inverts the order of the things, demanding that principles should be laid down first, and the facts proved from them afterwards. This process, when used to demonstrate the existence of a God, is called an Argument *à priori*.*

Such is Mr. Gillespie's argument, which we have examined in the following pages. It lays down certain elementary propositions, some true and some not, and argues from them in a manner, similar, in some respects, to that of Euclid's demonstrations in Geometry. The great difference between Mr. Gillespie and the Geometer is, that whilst Euclid bases his propositions on incontrovertible axioms and definitions, and reasons clearly and soundly, Mr. Gillespie builds his structure on materials, parts of which are very weak, and reasons, into the bargain, very often both ambiguously and fallaciously.†

However, without further preamble, let us proceed to our work of Examination.

But first let us give a bird's-eye view of the propositions, &c. which are to be criticised. In other words, let us steal Mr. Gillespie's Table of Contents; and reprint it here, for the edification of our readers. Thus shall they be 'posted up' beforehand in the enunciative features of the great 'Argument *à priori*.' The Work is in three 'Divisions'; and the First and Second Divisions are each subdivided into three 'Parts.'

* See Appendices B and C, pp. 40, 41.

† See Appendix D, p. 42.

Division I.

Part I.

Prop. I. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, *existing.*

„ II. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, *indivisible.*

Corollary. The parts of Infinity of Extension are, necessarily, *immoveable.*

Prop. III. There is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Extension.

„ IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, of *unity* and *simplicity.*

Corollary. The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Extension are, necessarily, immoveable.

Sub-Prop. The Material Universe is *finite in extension.*

Prop. V. There is, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion.

Part II.

Prop. I. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, *existing.*

„ II. Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, *indivisible.*

Corollary. The parts of Infinity of Duration are, necessarily, *immoveable.*

Prop. III. There is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Duration.

„ IV. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of *unity* and *simplicity.*

Corollary. The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are, necessarily, immoveable.

Sub-Prop. The Material Universe is *finite in duration.*

Corollary. Every succession of substances is *finite in duration.*

PROP. V. There is, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Duration.

Part III.

PROP. I. There is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

„ II. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of *unity* and *simplicity*.

„ III. There is, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

DIVISION II.

PART I. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily *Intelligent* and *All-knowing*.

„ II. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, *All-powerful*.

„ III. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing and All-powerful, is, necessarily, *entirely Free*.

DIVISION III.

PROPOSITION. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, *completely Happy*.

SUB-PROP. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration who is All-knowing,

All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, *perfectly Good*.

After Proposition I. of DIVISION I. Part III., the 'Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Infinity of Duration,' gradually gets the number of its Attributes augmented, and each succeeding Proposition gets longer and longer like the sentences in '*This is the House which Jack built.*'

It is obvious that if Proposition I. of DIVISION I. Part III. be not proved by Mr. Gillespie, each of the seven succeeding Propositions falls to the ground with it.

And it is also obvious that if the Proposition of DIVISION II. Part I. be unproved, the succeeding four Propositions fall to the ground in consequence.

And so on. In short, if any one of the seven Propositions preceding the last, be not demonstrated, all that succeed it are thereby rendered 'not-proven.'

And, generally: Any Proposition whatever will be shown to be not-proved, if the argument for its demonstration at all rests on a preceding unproved Proposition.

The Propositions of DIVISIONS II. and III. are the most important ones in the whole Argument. Grant them; and you are granting the existence of a Deity. But grant any Proposition of DIVISION I., and your concession is altogether less. Even the Propositions of Part III. might be granted; for it might be contended that *Space* is a Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration. But directly you come to the attribute of *Intelligence*, the affair becomes serious; and it behoves the critic to keep a sharp look-out.

The Proposition of Part I. of DIVISION II., then, is

the one which a critic would naturally turn to, first of all, as a test Proposition of the whole. If it should turn out to be satisfactorily deduced from preceding Propositions, the critic may then look at those prior parts of the 'Argument.' But if, on the other hand, this first Proposition of DIVISION II. turn out to be unproved, *even when granting, for argument's sake, all preceding Propositions*, then the critic might be allowed to throw down the 'Argument *a priori*,' without examining a word more: for, what precedes and what follows would be equally impotent for the demonstration of the Being of a Deity.

Let us take up this Proposition of Part I. of DIVISION II. in the first place, then. "*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent and All-knowing.*"

Demonstration: "For intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be.

"That it never began to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have a cause; for *whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And the cause of Intelligence must be of Intelligence; for, *what is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence to be*," &c. &c.

And this Mr. Gillespie calls a demonstration! Why, the two sentences which he has italicized are very far from being necessarily true. On the former of them, especially, volumes of controversy have been written; and Mr Gillespie simply *takes it for granted!**

We might be justified in ending our criticism of Mr. Gillespie's *a priori* Argument, at this point. We have

* See *ante*, p. ii.

shown that the Proposition of Part I. of Division II. is unproved; therefore all the succeeding Propositions fall to the ground; and, consequently, Mr. Gillespie's Argument *a priori* does not demonstrate the existence of a God.

But for the sake of criticism, we will just run through the preceding parts of the 'Argument,' commenting as we go along. And after that, we shall have a word or two to say respecting the subsequent Propositions likewise.

In the following comments on Mr. Gillespie's arguments, we have placed first the ordinal number or name of the proposition, then the enunciation, and lastly our remarks.

DIVISION I.

PART I.

Proposition I.

"*Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, existing.*"

By the word '*necessarily*,' here and elsewhere, Mr. Gillespie means 'necessarily, *in our belief or conception*.' "A necessary being is," he says,* "one whose existence is *necessarily believed by us*;—a being, in a word, whose non-existence *we cannot conceive*."

The argument for this Proposition is as follows:—

* *Exam. of Antitheos.* Part I. § 66.

All things the existence of which we cannot but believe are necessarily existing. (Def.)

We cannot but believe in the existence of Infinity of Extension.

Therefore Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.

Whether Infinity of Extension is full or empty, a 'mode' or a 'substance' are questions not by this Proposition attempted to be answered. These points are left for subsequent Propositions to deal with.

Proposition II.

"*Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, indivisible.*"

We can discover no error in the proof* of this Proposition; though, for all that, there may be one. For when dealing with subjects so much beyond the grasp of the human mind, as all questions concerning the Infinite are, it does not become us to pronounce too dogmatically or positively on the merits of a statement. If we afterwards should find this Proposition leading to anything repugnant to our other necessary conceptions, we may begin to suspect its truth. But in the meantime it appears to us (so far as we can judge) cleverly and satisfactorily demonstrated.

Corollary from Proposition II.

"*The parts of Infinity of Extension are, necessarily, immoveable among themselves.*"

This does not seem to us directly deducible from

* See *ante*, pp. iii—iv.

Proposition II. The argument given is that '*motion* of parts supposes, of necessity, *separation* of the parts.' But this is not at once evident. It may be the fact, but it requires further proof. *Separation* of parts requires that the parts separated have superficies of their own, and be removed from each other, be it by ever so little a distance.* Does *motion* of parts require all this? In order, for instance, to divide water, actual separation of parts must be effected, but does all *motion of water* require such actual division? Could not the parts even of a Plenum of Infinity of Extension have motion among themselves without having actually to be divided from each other by a certain amount of vacuum, however little? Could not the parts glide among each other without actual division being necessary? Possibly not; but we certainly think that further enlightenment on these points is necessary for the demonstration.

There is one other consideration. Supposing that there were a Plenum of Infinity of Extension, and suppose its parts were moveable among themselves (without being actually divided from each other), would the extension of any part in motion be considered as accompanying its substratum?—if so, the parts of Infinity of Extension would *not* be immoveable among themselves.

But if Infinity of Extension exists *per se* (that is, without its *necessarily*† having a substratum) it can have, evidently, no motion amongst its parts; for Infinite Ex-

* Prop. II. Dem. § 1.

† See definition of '*necessarily*,' &c.

tension *per se* is—nothing.* On this last supposition, therefore, the Corollary from Proposition II. *is* true. But *complete* assent cannot be accorded to the Corollary until the questions raised above shall have been answered. In the meantime we pass a qualified estimate on it.

Proposition III.

"*There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension.*"

A '*Being*' is defined by Mr. Gillespie to be 'whatever exists *per se*'—or 'whatever is not a quality or attribute.' The demonstration is as follows:—

Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, existing. (Prop. I.)

If Infinity of Extension necessarily exists *per se*, it is, itself, a 'necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Extension.' (Def. of 'Being.')

If, on the other hand, Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, a quality of something, then *that something* is a 'necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Extension.'

In either case there is a necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Extension.

This Proposition logically follows from Proposition I. and the Definition of *Being*.

* See Appendix E, p. 42.

Proposition IV.

"The Being of Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity."

Infinity of Extension and its Substratum being alike declared indivisible, it follows of necessity that a Being of Infinity of Extension must be considered so, likewise.

'Simplicity' is defined by Mr. Gillespie as 'unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible.' Such being the meaning of the phrase 'of unity and simplicity,' assent must be accorded to this Proposition IV.

§ 5 of this Proposition remarks that 'it is intuitively evident that the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than Infinity of Extension itself.'

If assent be given to Proposition II., assent must likewise be accorded here, for if the demonstration of Proposition II. be valid, the same words, *mutatis mutandis*, will be a demonstration in this place also.

Corollary to Proposition IV.

"The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Extension are, necessarily, immoveable among themselves."

The reason why assent cannot be given to this without further proof, may be gathered from our comments on the Corollary from Proposition II.

Sub-Proposition.

"The Material Universe is finite in Extension."

The argument is as follows:—

Whatever is divisible cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. (Prop. IV. § 5.) The Material Universe is divisible. Therefore the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. Therefore the Material Universe is finite in Extension.

But 'not being the Substratum of Infinity of Extension,' is not convertible with 'being finite in Extension.' Mr. Gillespie himself allows this,* quoting, with approbation, from Dr. Clarke,—'though matter had no limits, yet it might have within itself any assignable vacuities:' —in which case, it is obvious, it would be neither the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, nor finite in extension. On this point see likewise R. H. B.'s 'Refutation,' § § 33—6.†

This Sub-Proposition may possibly prove that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but it certainly does not demonstrate that it is finite in extension.

* *Exam. Antitheos.* Part IX. § 48.

† A Refutation of W. H. Gillespie's Argument. By R. H. B. (Farrah, 282, Strand.)

General Scholium.

It is here announced that throughout the remainder of the argument the expression 'Infinity of Expansion' will be used instead of 'Infinity of Extension.'*

Proposition V.

"*There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.*"

The argument is as follows :—

'Infinity of Expansion either subsists by itself, or it subsists not without a Substratum.'

'On the supposition that it subsists by itself,' 'there can be but one being of Infinity of Expansion ;' 'for, as 'tis evident, there can be but one Infinity of Expansion.'

And, 'on the supposition that Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being, there can be but one Being of Infinity of Expansion ;' for, 'as 'tis evident, there can no more be more than one Substratum of Infinity of Expansion, than there can be more than one Infinity of Expansion.'

On examining this argument, there will be discovered a weak point in it. It is gratuitously assumed that the following two suppositions are the only conceivable alternatives :—

1. Infinity of Expansion exists, necessarily† *without* a plenum.

* See Appendix F, p. 43.

† The word '*necessarily*' qualifies the preposition '*without*.'

2. Infinity of Expansion exists, necessarily* *with* a plenum.

Were these all that could be conceived, it is possible we might have no fault to find with this Proposition; but there are two other imaginable possibilities:—

1*a*. Infinity of Expansion exists, *not*† *necessarily*‡ *without* a plenum.

2*a*. Infinity of Expansion exists, *not*† *necessarily** *with* a plenum.

In reality, of course, there are but two alternatives: either Infinity of Expansion exists *without* a plenum, or it exists *with* a plenum. But our concern is not with things as they *are*, merely, but with things *as we cannot help conceiving them to be*; and the consequent introduction of the word '*necessarily*' just changes the two *objective* alternatives into four *subjective* statements.

Nos. 1*a* and 2*a* are somewhat incomplete separately; combining them we get a proposition which may better be regarded as the *residua propositio*:—

3. Infinity of Expansion exists, *not*† *necessarily*§ either with a plenum or without a plenum. (The meaning of which is that we can conceive Infinity of Expansion either with or without a plenum, that one is as easy for us to conceive as the other.)

Now if this be the truth it will materially affect the argumentation for Proposition V. For, supposing

* The word '*necessarily*' qualifies the preposition '*with*.'

† The word '*not*' qualifies the adverb '*necessarily*.'

‡ The word '*necessarily*' qualifies the preposition '*without*.'

§ The word '*necessarily*' qualifies the prepositions '*with*' and *without*.'

also that a plenum of Infinity of Expansion do exist, then there would be two 'Beings' (according to Def. of *Being*), each of Infinity of Expansion. Infinity of Expansion, itself, would be one of them (for, according to supposition, its plenum does not *necessarily* exist, and therefore it—*i.e.* Infinity of Expansion—exists *per se*); and its plenum would be the other. With this distinction, however,—that the former would be a *necessarily-existing* Being of Infinity of Expansion,—while the latter, though a Being of Infinity of Expansion, would not be a *necessarily-existing* one.

Perhaps Mr. Gillespie will evade this reasoning, already drawn out to too great a length, by saying that the enunciation, '*There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion*,' means, that there is but one necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Expansion; and that the word '*necessarily*,' in the enunciation, qualifies the verb '*is*,' and not the compound attributive adjunct '*but one*.' If this be the case, his logic is saved, but at the expense of his rhetoric.

PART II.

Proposition I.

"*Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing.*"

The truth or falsity of this turns on how the predicative phrase '*is existing*' is to be understood. 'Is existing' is in the present tense. Now, really, the Present Time is infinitesimal, dividing two Eternities, an Infinite Past, and a never-ending Future—and, like a

mathematical point, 'has position but no extent.'* In this respect there is no Infinity of Duration; but if the Proposition 'Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing,' be understood to mean no more than that there necessarily can have been no beginning to the Past, and that there necessarily can be no end to the Future;—then we can grant assent and pass on to the next Proposition.

Proposition II.

"*Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible.*"

Division is an idea applicable only to things possessing extension: the idea is utterly repugnant to that of duration. If the Proposition may be understood as equivalent to the statement that 'That Infinity of Duration is divisible, is, necessarily, absurd,' we can unreservedly assent thereunto. The very mention of parts of Infinity of Duration having superficies is enough; the two ideas are absolutely incompatible.

Corollary.

"*The Parts of Infinity of Duration are, necessarily, immoveable among themselves.*"

This can be assented to for the same reasons.

* See Appendix G, p. 43.

Proposition III.

"*There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration.*"

The Argument for this is as follows:—

Either Infinity of Duration exists without a substratum or not without a substratum (*i.e.* we cannot conceive Infinity of Duration except as *without* a substratum, or something eternally enduring; or, we cannot conceive it except as *with* a substratum or something eternally enduring.) In either case there is a Being of Infinity of Duration; for if Infinity of Duration necessarily has a substratum, that substratum is a Being of Infinity of Duration; and if Infinity of Duration necessarily is without a substratum, then it is, itself, a Being of Infinity of Duration.

No; Infinity of Duration would not be a Being if it had no substratum; for in order to be a Being, a thing must exist; and Infinity of Duration, as we explained above, does not exist.*

But although Mr. Gillespie has not demonstrated this Proposition, yet we have no fault to find with the Proposition itself.

For,

There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion. (Div. I. Part I. Prop. III.)

Whatever necessarily exists is of Infinity of Duration.

Therefore the necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Expansion is of Infinity of Duration.

* See bottom p. 22 and top p. 23.

Therefore there is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration.

Proposition IV.

"*The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.*"

But it is not necessarily true that a *not-necessarily*-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration must needs be indivisible. That is to say, it is not necessarily true that *any* eternally existing thing must be indivisible. At least Mr. Gillespie has advanced nothing in proof thereof. Suppose matter be eternal (and the supposition is quite fair in this place, for we have not yet come to the Proposition or Sub-Proposition especially devoted to the temporality of the Material Universe)—suppose matter be eternal, what has Mr. Gillespie, up to this point, advanced, to show that matter, if eternal, must be indivisible? Simply, nothing. For, of course, he cannot bring the Sub-Proposition forward as proof; for, as that, itself, depends on the particular proposition in hand, such a proceeding would be to 'reason in a circle.'

A Being of Infinity of Duration, thus, not having been proved necessarily indivisible, the attributes of *unity* and *simplicity* are consequently also unproven.

§ 5 says:—'That the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a self-evident truth.'

It is, on the contrary, by no means a self-evident

truth. There is no connection between the two. Divisibility and indivisibility of the *substratum* may be spoken about because it is of extent (whether of infinite or finite extent); but divisibility and indivisibility of Infinity of Duration itself, cannot be spoken of, because Infinity of Duration is *not of Extent but of Duration.**

But for all this, the statement itself (that the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is indivisible), is true.

For,

If Infinity of Duration necessarily have a substratum, such substratum is a necessarily-existing Being. But 'necessary existence implies Infinite Extension.' Therefore a necessarily-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration is of Infinite Expansion. But a Being of Infinity of Expansion is necessarily indivisible, therefore a necessarily-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible.

Corollary.

"*The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are, necessarily, immoveable among themselves.*"

This depends on whether the parts of the Being of Infinity of Expansion are, necessarily, immoveable among themselves.†

* See middle of p. 23.

† See last paragraph above; the last three lines on p. 18; and p. 16.

SUB-PROPOSITION.

"*The Material Universe is finite in Duration.*"

'Because it is divisible.' But this only proves that it is not a *necessarily-existing* Substratum of Infinity of Duration.

A necessarily-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration is indivisible (*p. 26, line 7*); but the Material Universe might be a Substratum of Infinity of Duration, though not a necessarily-existing one. It has not been proved that a *not-necessarily*-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration must be indivisible. (By a 'Substratum of Infinity of Duration,' of course, is meant a Being of Infinity of Duration; by a 'necessarily-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration,' is meant a necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Duration; and by a 'not-necessarily-existing Substratum of Infinity of Duration,' is meant a Being of Infinity of Duration, which, however, does not *necessarily* exist.)

COROLLARY.

"*Every succession of substances is finite in Duration.*"

This depends on the preceding Sub-Proposition, which, we saw, was not demonstrated; therefore this Corollary is not proved.

Proposition V.

"There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration."

If this means that there is necessarily but one necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Duration, it is deducible from previous Propositions as follows:—

There is but one necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Expansion. A necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Duration is of Infinity of Expansion. (*p. 26, line 12.*) Therefore there is but one necessarily-existing Being of Infinity of Duration.

But the Proposition does not prove that there can be but one Being of Infinity of Duration, necessarily-existing or not-necessarily-existing. There may be an infinite number of Beings of Infinity of Duration which do not exist necessarily, for anything that has been proved by Mr. Gillespie.

PART III.

Proposition I.

"There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration."

This Proposition is quite true. (*p. 24, two last lines.*) But the demonstration given is no demonstration at all.

It aims, however, to prove more than the actual statement in the enunciation—namely: That Infinity of Expansion necessarily has a substratum, and that there necessarily is, in consequence, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration *which is not merely Space.*

This enlarged Proposition is more important than that contained in the enunciation; for if the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration were not proved different from mere Space, such a Being would scarcely be of use to Mr. Gillespie in the following Divisions of the Argument.

Considerable defect will therefore be discovered in 'The Argument *à priori*,' if it can be shown that this Prop. I. of Part III. does not demonstrate the existence of a Substratum to Space.

The Argument is as follows:—

Either Infinity of Expansion exists by itself, and Infinity of Duration by itself; or, Infinity of Expansion has a substratum, and Infinity of Duration has a substratum. They cannot exist by themselves, for if they did they are so connected that they would be identical—which is absurd. Therefore they don't exist by themselves. And therefore each has a substratum.

There are two important errors in this reasoning; one in each premiss.

In the first place the alternatives mentioned above are not the only possibilities. A third is, Infinity of Expansion has no substratum, but Infinity of Duration has one. (This would be the case if Infinity of Expansion had no substratum; for then Infinity of Expansion would be substratum to Infinity of Duration.) No

absurdity would follow from the supposition of the truth of this third possibility; there is nothing *a priori* absurd in the identity of Infinity of Expansion and the Substratum of Infinity of Duration.

On the other hand granting that those alternatives are indeed the only possibilities, even then the conclusion would not follow; for the second premiss* is fallacious. But this has been so admirably shown by R. H. B. in his 'Refutation,' §§ 5—14, that we need not go over the same ground again.†

Antitheos has some remarks on this same point, which (as his Refutation is now out of print) we will quote:—

"There is nothing absurd in holding these two infinities (Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration) to exist together; and why? Because they are of totally different kinds. They are as different as time and place, which people, in their most common intercourse, regard as entirely distinct. Indeed, these infinities are nothing else than time and place extended beyond all bounds."

But to return. Mr. Gillespie not having shown the impossibility of there being no substratum to Infinity of Expansion, it follows he has not proved that there is a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration, which is not Space merely.

* To wit, that Space and Duration would be identical.

† See Appendix H, p. 44.

PROPOSITION II.

"*The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.*"

This follows from Proposition IV. of Part I. of this Division.

PROPOSITION III.

"*There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.*"

This follows from Proposition V. of Part I., and is true if the word 'necessarily' qualifies the preceding verb 'is.' (See last paragraph of the examination of Proposition V. of Part I.)

DIVISION II.

PART I.

PROPOSITION.

"*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent and All-Knowing.*"

We have already seen (*p. 13*) that this Proposition is to be numbered among the unproven. This verdict was arrived at by seeing that two of the premisses on which

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the argument depends were unproved, even if all the Propositions in DIVISION I. had been demonstrated.

Let us reverse our method; and let us see whether this Proposition be demonstrated, even on the supposition of the necessary truth of the two premisses aforesaid; that is, on the supposition that '*Whatever begins to be must have a cause,*' and '*What is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be,*' are necessary truths.

Following the supposition of the necessary truth of those two data, comes the conclusion that Intelligence must be of Infinity of Duration.

The Corollary from the Sub-Proposition in Part II. of Division I. ('*Every succession of substances is finite in Duration*') is then pressed into the service, to prove that there is an Intelligent Being of Infinity of Duration.

Proposition V. of Part II. of Division I. is then brought forward announcing that *there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration,* in order to show that the Intelligent Being of Infinity of Duration is identical with the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, affirmed to exist by the Propositions of Part III. of Division I.

Now, we saw that the Corollary from the Sub-Proposition, Part II. Division I. was not demonstrated; consequently, the conclusion, that *there is an Intelligent Being of Infinity of Duration,* falls to the ground unproven.

Thus is this Proposition of Part I. Division II. doubly shown to be undemonstrated.

PART II.

Proposition.

"*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, All-powerful.*"

Demonstration :

The Material Universe is finite in duration. (Division I. Part II. Sub-Proposition.) *Whatever begins to be must have a cause:* Therefore the Material Universe had a cause. This cause must be the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration who is All-knowing. Therefore, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is All-powerful.

And this, Mr. Gillespie calls an Argument *à priori!* Why, the reasonings in nearly every sentence of the above give, at most, '*probable evidence* only,' and ought therefore by Mr. Gillespie's own definition to be called *à posteriori.**

But apart from this, the Proposition can, by no means, be held to be demonstrated. For, in the first place, the Material Universe has not been proved to be finite in

* *Necessary Existence of God*, p. 3, § 1.

duration ;* and, secondly, it has not been proved that there is a Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing.†

PART III.

Proposition.

"*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing and All-powerful, is, necessarily, entirely Free.*"

This Proposition depends on the foregoing (which we saw was unproved) and consequently it is not demonstrated.

But apart from this, we might take exception to the Proposition on account of the highly metaphysical and unintelligible word 'Free,' on which volumes have been written to perplex the world.

And apart from both these considerations, the Proposition is unproven, on account of one of the data on which it rests being Division I. Part II. Corollary from Sub-Proposition, which we saw was not demonstrated.‡

Consequently, this Proposition of Division II Part III. is trebly shown to be unproved.

* See p. 27. † See p. 32. ‡ See p. 27.

DIVISION III.

Proposition.

"*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, completely Happy.*"

This Proposition depends on the previous one, and on certain considerations of probability, notwithstanding the introduction by Mr. Gillespie of the sentence, *Every position we cannot but believe is a necessary truth.* 'We cannot but believe that God is happy, therefore He is necessarily happy,' says Mr. Gillespie in effect; but how can our Theologian be sure that such a belief is indeed a conviction ineradicable from the human mind? When he claimed the belief in Extension as an irresistible belief,* we had nothing to say in reply; but surely the belief in God's happiness cannot be placed in that category.

Sub-Proposition.

"*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good.*"

Here again our Author would place a matter of

* Division I. Part I. Proposition I.

opinion on a footing with necessary truths. The existence of Devil worshippers shows that the proposition of God's goodness is, by no means, an intuitive belief of the human mind.

If Mr. Gillespie claimed less for his reasonings, if he were content to call his last few pages arguments giving *probable evidence* only,* we might, then, have no fault to find. But when he insists that his words construct *demonstrations*, he attracts adverse criticisms which he might not otherwise have drawn upon his work.

We have now come to the end of 'The Argument *à priori* for a Great First Cause;' and the result of our examination may be epitomised as follows:—

DIVISION I.

Part I.

Proposition I.	True.
,, II.	True.
Corollary,	*Not proved.*
Proposition III.	True.†
,, IV.	True.
Corollary,	*Not proved.*
Sub-Proposition,	*Not proved.*
Proposition V.	Ambiguous.

* *Necessary Existence*, p. 3, § 1.

† In Mr. Gillespie's sense of the words.

Part II.

Proposition I.	Ambiguous.
„ II.	True.
Corollary,	True.
Proposition III.	*Not proved.*
„ IV.	*Not proved.*
Corollary,	*Not proved.*
Sub-Proposition,	*Not proved.*
Corollary,	*Not proved.*
Proposition V.	Ambiguous.

Part III.

Proposition I.	*Not proved.*
„ II.	True.
„ III.	Ambiguous.

Division II.

Part I.	*Not proved.*
„ II.	*Not proved.*
„ III.	*Not proved.*

Division III.

Proposition,	*Not proved.*
Sub-Proposition,	*Not proved.*

Oh for a grand peroration to close this examination of Mr. Gillespie's most remarkable, most inconclusive, most undeservedly praised, most self-satisfied, *pseudo-à-priori* Argument! But facts 'speak louder than words,' and we leave our thankless task with confidence in the judgment of our readers.

APPENDIX.

A.

The belief in the existence of a Deity is neither innate nor intuitive. . . . . &c.—P. 7, line 1.

"*Idea of God not innate.*— . . . Hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the Bay of Soldania, in Brazil, in Boranday, and the Carribee Islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo *in Literis, ex Paraquariâ de Caaiguarum Conversione,* has these words: *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum et hominis animam significet: nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.* These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself without the help of letters and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who

yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. . . . .

"But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God, whereof yet history tells us the contrary,) it would not from thence follow that the idea of him was innate. . .

"The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, . . . must necessarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations."—*Locke*, 'Essay concerning Human Understanding,' Book I. Chap. iv. §§ 8, 9, 10.

B.

But there is a race of Philosophers . . . . . and these Elevated Beings have great faith in a process of arriving at truth which they call METAPHYSICS.—P. 8, last para.

In consequence of some of the absurdest notions ever given to the world, being dubbed '*philosophy*' and '*metaphysics*,' these words have fallen into discredit. Comte, for instance, uses the term metaphysics only in the bad sense; and Mr. G. H. Lewes (whom every one calls a philosopher and a metaphysician) writes a book, refuting all the most erroneous psychological theories that the world has seen, and calls it a History of *Philosophy*. But to apply the words philosophy and metaphysics exclusively to what is false or absurd is

really as unjust to these terms, as it would be wrongful to use the word *poetry* to denote *doggerel*. The words 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics' ought to have been reserved for the *true* science. When a wretched doggerel claims to be poetry, we indignantly refuse it that honour; and we ought to do similarly when a wretched tissue of sophisms or absurdities claims to be called philosophy. We want a term to express *bad* philosophy.

Poetry : Doggerel :: Philosophy : x.

If we had always had a term equivalent to x, the words *philosophy* and *metaphysics* would not now have lost caste.

C.

This process, when used to demonstrate the existence of a God, is called an Argument A PRIORI.—Top p. 9.

The definitions of an Argument *à priori*, and an Argument *à posteriori* on our title page, are Mr. Gillespie's. They do not contradict our own definitions on p. 8, in reality. There are sometimes more ways than one of defining a thing. For instance, a *square* may be defined as a 'plane figure, containing a right angle, formed by four straight lines of equal length,' or as a 'plane rectilinear rectangle, whose diagonals cross each other at right angles.'

D.

[Mr. Gillespie's Argument] *lays down certain elementary propositions, some true and some not.*—P. 9, line 7.

Mr. Gillespie does not lay them all down together at the beginning of the argument, as Euclid does his Definitions, Axioms and Postulates; but scatters them throughout the argument in the places where they are wanted.

E.

Infinite Extension PER SE *is—nothing.*—P. 17, line 1.

Not *nothing* in Mr. Gillespie's signification of the word. That writer defines '*Being*' and '*Substance*' as whatever exists *per se*. Consequently he would call Infinite Extension *per se* a 'Being' or 'Substance.' But this is a talk about mere words. It is sufficient for us to explain that we have used the word 'nothing,' as quoted above, in the *popular* sense. Suppose it were possible to get an absolute vacuum by withdrawing every particle of air and everything else, tangible or intangible, from, say, a glass bottle. And suppose that the question were then asked, 'What is in that bottle?' Would not the answer, 'Nothing,' be perfectly intelligible; and would it not convey the truth? And yet

Extension (or *Space*) would be within the bottle. Such Space would be deemed Nothing. Behold, in such thought of Space, our meaning, also.

F.

[*Re* GENERAL SCHOLIUM.]

We have not noticed what Mr. Gillespie here says about Penetration; for the subject is not needed in our examination of his subsequent Propositions.

G.

The Present Time, ... like a mathematical point, has position but no extent.—P. 23, line 1.

This, as a figure. In reality, 'twere absurd to speak of Duration having position;—*position*, in popular language, meaning position in space.

H.

But this has been so admirably shown by R. H. B., in his Refutation, §§ 5—14, that we need not go over the same ground again.—P. 30.

"§ 5. Proposition I. Part III. is intended to prove that there is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. But Mr. Gillespie also brings into this proposition his attempt to prove that neither Infinity of Expansion nor Infinity of Duration can subsist without a substratum, which, though not by enunciation the object of the proposition, is in reality of more vital importance to the argument than the nominal thing to be proved.

"§ 6. The author commences his demonstration by assuming that Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration both exist *per se;* and it is from this supposition that he attempts to prove a *reductio ad absurdum,* and consequently to overthrow the theory that Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration can exist *per se.* But I think he has failed in his object, through reasoning upon a fallacy which I shall here endeavour to point out.

"§ 7. Mr. Gillespie says, in § 4 of this Proposition:—'Every part of Infinity of Expansion being in every part of Infinity of Duration, every part of the Being of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the Being of Infinity of Duration,' &c. As he has not favoured us with his *reasons* for making this assumption, nor attempted to explain what he means, one is quite justi-

fied in looking round for something which would tend to justify his words. Accordingly, turning to one of his favourite authorities, and certainly his *greatest, Locke*, we find in the chapter (in his great 'Essay') on 'Duration and Expansion considered together,' what we are in search of, viz. in § 12, last clause but one:—'To conclude, Expansion and Duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of Space being in every part of Duration, and every part of Duration in every part of Expansion.' As these are almost the *very words* employed by Mr. Gillespie, and as he quotes them farther on in his work,* I think one may be quite justified in supposing that it is from *here* that he takes his text.

"§ 8. Now, as there can only be *one* meaning applicable to these words of Locke, which we have just cited, and, as Mr. G. has (as I shall endeavour to show) unfortunately *mistaken* that meaning; it will be well for us here to consider in what sense they are to be taken. I grant that the way in which Locke has put the words in question might be liable to mislead any one who had not carefully read what immediately *precedes* them. Referring to the commencement of the same paragraph, we read,—'Duration and Time, which is part of it, is the idea we have of perishing distance, of which *no two parts exist together*, but follow each other in succession; as expansion is the idea of *lasting* distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of succession, &c.' We have now the clue to what Locke meant by the passage in question; and I find it difficult to conceive

"* Page 294, § 17, Russel Edition.—*Note by R. H. B.*

how any one should so completely mistake it, as it appears Mr. Gillespie has done.

"§ 9. As it is *intuitively evident* that no two parts of Duration exist together (*i.e.* *simultaneously*) it would be an utter contradiction to use the words 'every part' in a *collective* sense (when applied to *Duration*) in the clauses quoted, for that would be equal to saying 'every part (*i.e. all* the parts—the *whole*) of Duration is in every part (*i.e.* the *whole*) of Expansion,' thus making the whole of Duration exist at the present moment, which would be absurd. We must, therefore, in order to avoid directly *contradicting* what was written just before, understand 'every,' when applied to the parts of Duration in these passages, to mean '*each.*' Let us, therefore, for the sake of argument, insert 'each' in the place of 'every,' where the latter word is applied to the parts of Duration (for whether the words are *actually* changed or not, they must be *understood* this way, to preserve the sense). Locke's passage will then stand thus,—'Every part of space being in each part of Duration, and each part of Duration in every part of Expansion,' the evident meaning of which is, that the *whole* (*i.e.* every part) of Expansion *now* exists, and that this present moment is applicable to every part (*i.e.* the *whole*) of Expansion.

"§ 10. We can now turn to Mr. Gillespie's proposition § 4, which, in order to be understood clearly, must be read in the same way. Let us therefore proceed, as we have done with Locke, that is, in every instance where 'every' occurs, applied to the parts of *Duration*, read 'each' in its place. The passage in question will now

stand thus:—'Every part of Infinity of Expansion being in each part of Infinity of Duration, every part of the Being of Infinity of Expansion is in each part of the Being of Infinity of Duration. And each part of Infinity of Duration being in every part of Infinity of Expansion, each part of the Being of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Being of Infinity of Expansion.'

"§ 11. The passage as it now stands everybody must assent to, as its sense and truth are evident. Let us, therefore, pass on to § 5, continuing in the same manner, thus:—'To wit, the whole of Infinity of Expansion (as 'every part,' used collectively is convertible with 'whole') being in each part (because 'each part' and 'whole' are decidedly *not* convertible) of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the Being of Infinity of Expansion is in each part of the Being of Infinity of Duration. And each part of Infinity of Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, each part of the Being of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of the Being of Infinity of Expansion.

"§ 12. Now Mr. Gillespie *must* admit that no two parts of Duration exist together, and yet he says 'the whole of Infinity of Duration, is (*i.e.* exists at the present speaking) in the whole of Infinity of Expansion.' Thus making the *whole* equal to its *part;* and also making *yesterday* and *to-morrow* exist at the present moment!!

"§ 13. Perhaps it will be urged the Being of Infinity of Duration must exist *now* as a *whole,* and also have existed *as a whole* from all eternity, else it would not, strictly speaking, be a Being of Infinity of Duration. But I will

overthrow that argument by means of Mr. G.'s *own words*. Under this hypothesis, namely, that Infinity of Duration exists *without* a substratum (*which alone* is the hypothesis with which we now are dealing), Infinity of Duration and the *Being* of Infinity of Duration are *identical*, not different.* Consequently, as Infinity of Duration has *no two parts together*, but all the parts following each other in endless succession, so likewise the *Being* of Infinity of Duration has no two parts existing together, but all following in succession. Therefore, as it is a contradiction to say 'the whole of Infinity of Duration *is*,' so also, under this hypothesis, it is a contradiction to say 'the whole of the *Being* of Infinity of Duration *is*.'

"§ 14. It will now be plainly seen that the absurd conclusion that Mr. Gillespie arrives at (viz. that Infinity of Expansion is Infinity of Duration), follows not from the reasoning as amended above. I have, therefore, shown (if my statements are correct) that Mr. Gillespie has not proved that Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration, cannot exist *per se*."—'*Refutation*.' *By R. H. B.*

"* See Proposition III. Part II. § 3."—*Note by R. H. B.*

END.

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